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INTRODUCTION
"Death row volunteerism,"' defined broadly, refers to criminal de-
fendants who refuse to present mitigating evidence during sentenc-
ing in capital cases, or to criminal defendants2 who are sentenced to
death and then waive post-sentencing appeals.3 By at least one esti-
mate, a majority of persons on death row request execution at some
point during their criminal proceedings, and successful cases of vol-
unteering are fairly common throughout the United States.4 To wit,
betweenJanuary 1, 1976, and December 31, 2005, 886 inmates in the
United States were executed unwillingly, while 118, or approximately
twelve percent of all executed inmates, were volunteers.5
Despite the prevalence of death row volunteerism, legal scholars
have not reached a consensus as to whether states have a constitu-
tional obligation to prevent defendants from volunteering to be put
* J.D., 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.B.E., 2007, University of Pennsylvania
Center for Bioethics; A.B., 2001, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Professors Matthew
Adler and Anita Allen-Castellito for their comments and to Jacob Nagy for his support. All er-
rors are the author's alone.
The terms "death row volunteers" and "death row volunteerism" have been used by a
number of scholars. See generally AnthonyJ. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument
for Restricting a Defendant's Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30
AM.J. CRIM. L. 75, 76 n.2 (2002) (discussing the etymology of the phrase "volunteering for exe-
cution").
For consistency and ease of use, even death row inmates who have been sentenced to die
are referred to as "defendants" or "capital defendants" throughout this Comment.
For purposes of this Comment, I will focus primarily on death row volunteerism after sen-
tencing. Many of the arguments set out below also have implications for a defendant's refusal
to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
4 See G. Richard Strafer, VolunteeringforExecution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of
Third Party Intervention, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 861 (1983) ("Such instances of citi-
zens 'volunteering' to be executed are by no means uncommon and certainly not "unique in
the annals of the Court." (citation omitted)).
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Searchable Database of Executions, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
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to death, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on that spe-
cific issue. In fact, legal scholars struggle with how to classify death
row volunteers: one camp of scholars argues that volunteers are indi-
viduals who are asserting their autonomy through an honorable, al-
beit tragic, "last act,",6 while another camp argues that volunteers who
refuse to fight their death sentences are committing irrational suicide
because of depression caused by the poor conditions that are preva-
7lent on death row. In waging this debate, scholars from both camps
largely have explored the constitutionality of death row volunteerism
through the lens of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and un-
usual punishment."
8
Part I of this Comment will explore the U.S. Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence related to death row volunteerism and discuss how state
courts have construed that jurisprudence in analyzing the rights of
death row inmates. Part II will examine scholarship on the constitu-
tionality of death row volunteerism under the Eighth Amendment
and conclude that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, taken as a
whole, does not create a broad Eighth Amendment obligation for
states to mandate post-conviction appeals. Part III will argue that
substantive due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment
represents a better approach to exploring states' obligations to pre-
vent death row volunteerism, specifically through comparison of post-
conviction appeals with irrational suicide, physician-assisted suicide,
or refusal of lifesaving treatment. This Comment will demonstrate
that due process analysis allows for consideration of the autonomy-
assertion versus irrational-suicide debate in a new light; it will estab-
lish that death row volunteerism by competent defendants is also
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV will briefly
discuss the implications of allowing death row volunteerism on the
death penalty abolition movement in the United States.
6 See, e.g., Kathleen L. Johnson, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or an Intimate Decision ?, 54
S. CAL. L. REv. 575, 627 (1981) (proposing that states allow capital defendants to waive post-
sentencing appeals to protect "the capital defendant's right to the privacy of 'intimate deci-
sion'" (footnote omitted)); Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned
Prisoners, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 573 (1984) ("If one is going to argue that even
condemned murderers retain some spark of humanity, some rights of individual autonomy,
then something must be done to... permit those who wish to terminate that existence through
execution of sentence the right to do so.").
7 See, e.g., C. Lee Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making: Death Row
Volunteering and Euthanasia, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1109, 1130-32 (2004) (discussing
capital defense attorneys' beliefs that most death row volunteers are depressed and irrational).
8 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REv. 1363, 1382-87
(1988) (denying an Eighth Amendment obligation to prevent death row volunteerism); Linda
E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Pre-
sent Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95, 107-29 (1987)
(reviewing the historical role of the Eighth Amendment vis-A-vis death row volunteerism, par-
ticularly at the mitigation phase of trial).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND DEATH Row VOLUNTEERISM
The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled explicitly on whether
state laws that allow defendants to expedite execution violate either
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Supreme
Court has issued several decisions that have broad implications for
the death row volunteerism debate. Most notably, in Faretta v. Cali-
fornia, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a right to pro-
ceed in his case without counsel under the Sixth Amendment.9 In
Faretta, a criminal defendant attempted to waive his right to assistance
of counsel, but the trial court refused to conduct the trial without in-
tervention from the local public defender's office.'0 The Court in-
validated the trial court's actions, explaining that "[t]he language
and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the
other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to
a willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between
an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally."'"
A decade later, the Court reiterated its Faretta holding in McKaskle v.
Wiggins12 A number of lower courts have read Faretta and its progeny
broadly to establish or protect defendant autonomy in a wide range
of contexts, including in waiving post-sentencing appeals;1 3 to date,
the Court has not discouraged them. For example, in Lenhard v.
Wolff the Court refused to address whether a capital defendant must
be prevented from refusing to present mitigating evidence at sentenc-
ing, 1 4 leaving undisturbed a state trial court's holding that, under
Faretta, a defendant had the right to refuse to present mitigating evi-
dence in his capital trial.'"
A second body of U.S. Supreme Court decisions has established
standards to determine defendants'-and particularly capital defen-
9 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1974).
10 Id. at 807-11. In its ruling, the trial court cited People v. Sharp, 499 P.2d 489, 492-93 (Cal.
1972), in which the California Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that
a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence" did not create a corresponding right for a criminal defendant to choose to proceed pro
se. Id. at811-12.
11 Id. at 820.
12 465 U.S. 168, 187-88 (explaining that while "Faretta affirmed the defendant's constitu-
tional right to appear on stage at his trial [,]" courts could allow public defenders to be present at
trial-even where defendants waive their right to counsel and proceed pro se-so that the pub-
lic defenders could instruct the defendants about courtroom proceedings and assist them in
mounting their own defense).
13 See notes 29-31 and the accompanying text for a brief survey of states' various applica-
tions of Faretta.
14 444 U.S. 807, 807 (1979) (refusing to stay the defendant's execution at the behest of the
public defenders in his jurisdiction).
15 See id. at 808-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recounting the trial court's application of
Faretta to the instant case).
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dants'-mental competency during or after trial. In Rees v. Peyton, the
Court held that it would not decide whether a capital defendant
could waive his post-conviction appeals until a district court first de-
termined the defendant's
mental competence in the present posture of things, that is,
whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a
rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning fur-
ther litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering
from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substan-
tially affect his capacity in the premises.
1 6
One year later, the Court stayed the defendant's execution. 17
In Godinez v. Moran, the Court reaffirmed the importance of de-
termining the competence of defendants in capital cases. 8 In Godi-
nez, a Nevada trial court allowed a capital defendant to plead guilty to
first-degree murder after two psychiatrists found that he was compe-
tent to stand trial.'9 The defendant later challenged his conviction as
violative of the Due Process Clause, alleging that the trial court failed
to apily a sufficiently stringent standard to determine his compe-
tency. The Court declined to reverse his conviction on due process
grounds, holding that the trial court properly ascertained that the de-
fendant was competent before accepting his guilty plea.2' Synthesiz-
ing its holdings in Rees and subsequent case law, the Court ex-
plained that defendants may plead guilty to capital crimes if they have
a rational understanding of the proceedings against them and if
they have waived their constitutional rights knowingly and voluntar-
ily.
The Court's holdings in Rees and Godinez are significant to the
death row volunteerism debate for two primary reasons. First, and
most important, the Court's articulations of competency tests for
capital defendants who plead guilty or waive post-conviction appeals
16 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966).
17 Rees v. Peyton, 386 U.S. 989 (1967).
1s 509 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1993).
19 Id. at 392-93.
20 Id. at 393-94.
21 Id. at 391.
See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1990) (holding that a capital defen-
dant may waive his right to appeal if he does so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and if
there is no meaningful evidence that he suffers from a mental disease, disorder, or defect that
affects his capacity to make an intelligent decision); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013
(1976) (holding that the Court will not intervene where a capital defendant makes a "knowing
and intelligent waiver" of his right to appeal).
23 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per cu-
riam)).
24 Id. at 400. As the Court noted, criminal defendants who enter guilty pleas waive three
constitutional rights: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to confront their accusers. Id. at 397 n.7.
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implicitly establish that such capital defendants are not per se incom-
petent as a matter of law. Second, if the Court were to consider the
constitutionality of allowing death row inmates to waive their post-
conviction appeals, it first would determine, as a threshold matter,
whether those inmates met the competency standard articulated in
Rees and refined in Godinez.
Yet it is unlikely that the Court would consider the constitutionality
of post-conviction appeal waivers by competent defendants based on
its "next friend" jurisprudence:2 5 the Court repeatedly has held that
third parties do not have standing to challenge competent capital de-
fendants' decisions to waive their appeals.2 6 First, in Gilmore v. Utah,
the Court refused to grant standing to the mother of the defendant
so that she could challenge the defendant's decision to expedite his
execution, explaining,
the Court is convinced that Gary Mark Gilmore made a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he might
have asserted after the Utah trial court's sentence was imposed,
and, specifically, that the State's determinations of his compe-
tence knowingly and intelligently to waive any and all such
rights were firmly grounded.
The Supreme Court reiterated its unwillingness to recognize "next
friends," or third party interveners, in Whitmore v. Arkansas, holding
that a capital defendant did not have "next friend" standing to chal-
lenge a fellow capital defendant's waiver of appeal because the de-
fendant had "given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his
right to proceed, and his access to court is otherwise unimpeded.,
2s
25 For a good definition of "next friend" jurisprudence, see Casey, supra note 1, at 79 n.22.
Casey explains:
"Next friend" standing is the concept that under certain circumstances a qualifying party
may be able to bring claims as a "next friend" on behalf of the party with proper stand-
ing. These claims most frequently occur where a "next friend" appears in court "on be-
half of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or
inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves."
Id. (citations omitted).
26 Challenges to defendants' decisions to be put to death typically (and usually unsuccess-
fully) come from third parties who seek "next friend" standing, such as family members, de-
fense attorneys, or anti-death penalty activists. In the absence of recognized "next friends,"
such challenges must come from parties with automatic standing: that is, the defendants them-
selves, who will challenge their own waiver of post-conviction appeals only under very rare cir-
cumstances, and governments, which have vested interests in seeing the defendants put to
death. See generally 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 264 (2005) (noting that, in general, parties
to litigation have the exclusive right to appeal decisions of lower courts related to that litiga-
tion).
27 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976). In a scathing dissent that frequently is cited by opponents of
the death penalty,Justice White opined that "the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal
case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 1018 (White,J., dissenting).
28 495 U.S. 149, 150 (1990).
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Because the Court has refused to recognize "next friends" in the
death row volunteerism context, only two categories of parties have
standing to challenge competent defendants' decisions to hasten
their deaths: defendants that have asked to be put to death and the
states that have sentenced them to die. Yet while such challenges are
unlikely, they are not unthinkable, as the Court conceivably could
agree to hear arguments in a case in which a defendant seeks to re-
scind his waiver of post-conviction appeals as his execution nears.
Because the Court has never explicitly ruled on the constitutional-
ity of death row volunteerism by competent defendants, states have
applied the Court's holdings on defendant autonomy, competency
requirements, and lack of "next friend" standing in a variety of ways.
As noted above, a number of lower courts-including state supreme
courts-have construed Faretta as recognizing the right of competent
defendants to waive their post-conviction state and federal appeals.29
Other states have allowed defendants to waive their state and federal
appeals based on state common or statutory law rather than on their
construction of U.S. Supreme Court decisions.30 A third set of states
explicitly or implicitly has refused to extend Faretta to defendants who
wish to waive appeals to hasten their executions. Such divergent in-
terpretations of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrate that
states' obligations to prevent capital defendants from waiving their
post-conviction appeals are much less clear-cut than a cursory glance
at the Court's precedent might imply. On balance, however, the Su-
preme Court precedent probably does not obligate states to require
capital defendants to appeal their convictions against their will.
29 See, e.g., Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988) (construing Faretta to support the
assertion that "all competent defendants have a right to control their own destinies"); Bishop v.
State, 597 P.2d 273 (Nev. 1979) (construing Faretta to mean that a defendant may waive the
presentation of mitigating evidence as part of his self-representation); State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d
576 (Ohio 1990) (citing Faretta to validate a defendant's autonomy and self-interest in control-
ling her future).
30 These states include Arkansas, where the court in State v. Robbins, 5 S.W.3d 51 (Ark. 1999),
ruled that while a defendant may waive his right to appeal his death penalty sentence, the ap-
pellate court is required to conduct a mandatory review of the record; Louisiana, where the
court concluded in State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982), that counsel is not ineffective for
proceeding in compliance with a defendant's willingness to be sentenced to death; and South
Carolina, whose judges found in State v. Torrence, 473 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1996), that provisions for
automatic appeal are waivable by defendants sentenced to the death penalty.
1 See, e.g., People v. Deere, 710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985) (holding that a defendant may not
waive the presentation of mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital case);
State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106 (N.J. 1996) (imposing an application for post-conviction relief,
pursued by court-appointed counsel, that cannot be waived by a defendant).
[Vol. 9:4
REDEFINING A FINAL A CT
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS FOR DEATH ROW
VOLUNTEERISM
Traditionally, scholars have construed the constitutionality of
death row volunteerism through the prism of the Eighth Amend-
mentC-2 -albeit with dramatically different results. For example, in
one oft-cited article,33 Linda E. Carter argues that because the right to
present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial
is protected by the Eighth Amendment, and because the Eighth
Amendment is "unwaivable '' 4 when the good of society is at stake,
death row volunteerism at the sentencing phase is unconstitutional. s
Specifically, she explains: "The integrity of the criminal justice system
is... jeopardized if eighth amendment protections can be waived
without principled limitations. The language and history of the
amendment support such an interpretation."3  Carter adds: "More-
over, the societal interest in precluding arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty is strong.07  She thus concludes that the Eighth
Amendment is unwaivable, and so capital defendants may not refuse
to prevent mitigating evidence at trial because such refusal "invali-
dates the delicately balanced protection for safeguarding against the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.""
While Carter limits her reasoning to the mitigation phase of capi-
tal trials, it can be applied to post-sentencing appeals as well. In fact,
Justice Thurgood Marshall took this approach in several dissents dur-
ing his tenure on the Supreme Court, arguing that capital defendants
could not waive their Eighth Amendment rights to post-conviction
appeals. For example, in Gilmore v. Utah, Justice Marshall argued in
his dissent: "I believe that the Eighth Amendment not only protects
the right of individuals not to be victims of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric pun-
32 For helpful background on the history of the Eighth Amendment, see Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment, 32 CONN. L. REv. 615, 618-30 (2000), and Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our
Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 661, 667-82 (2004).
" See, e.g., Casey, supra note 1, at 80 n.25 (citing Carter, supra note 8, for her discussion of
the Whitmore v. Arkansas and Gilmore v. Utah cases discussed in Part I).
34 For a thorough discussion of the "waivability" of certain constitutional rights, see Jason
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 801 (2003).
35 See Carter, supra note 8, at 109-11 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment prevents capi-
tal defendants from refusing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing).
36 Id. at 110.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 111.
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ishments. '3 9 In Whitmore v. Arkansas, Justice Marshall, joined by Jus-
tice Brennan, reiterated this point of view, adding:
Appellate review is necessary not only to safeguard a defen-
dant's right not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment but
also to protect society's fundamental interest in ensuring that
the coercive power of the State is not employed in a manner
that shocks the community's conscience or undermines the in-
tegrity of our criminal justice system.40
Justice Marshall further explained: "Although death may, to some
death row inmates, seem preferable to life in prison, society has the
right, and indeed the obligation, to see that procedural safeguards
are observed before the State takes a human life.
41
As persuasive as Carter's and Justice Marshall's perspective may be
to some members of the legal community, no U.S. Supreme Court
majority has endorsed the "unwaivability" of the Eighth Amendment.
Other scholars also disagree with the view that the Eighth Amend-
ment forecloses defendants from waiving their post-conviction ap-
peals. For example, Richard J. Bonnie argues that the Eighth
Amendment protects individual rights only;42 it therefore does not es-
tablish "a societal interest in promoting leniency or in reducing the
number of death sentences. 4 3 Bonnie adds that any state's obligation
to prevent death row volunteerism must be established by state stat-
ute, rather than by the Constitution,44 although he expresses skepti-
cism that such a statute reasonably could be implemented by the
states.45 Finally, the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence creates a
reasonable assumption that the Court almost certainly would not
adopt Carter's and Justice Marshall's view of the Eighth Amendment.
As discussed more extensively in Part I, the Court's decisions support-
ing competent capital defendants' decisional autonomy regarding
prosecutions probably mean that competent death row inmates have
a right to waive post-conviction appeals. This assumption is further
429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
40 495 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1990) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 175-76.
42 See Bonnie, supra note 8, at 1382-84 (arguing that capital defendants' individual Eighth
Amendment interests in reducing the risk of the arbitrary imposition of death sentences do not
implicate states).
43 Id. at 1383-84.
44 See id. at 1384 ("Even if a capital defendant may waive his eighth amendment interest in
individualized capital sentencing, an equivalent societal interest may be independently estab-
lished by state capital sentencing statutes."); cf State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981)
(holding that an Idaho statute mandates review of the procedural elements of death penalty
sentencing).
45 See Bonnie, supra note 8, at 1387 (arguing that systemic and procedural barriers to pre-
venting death row inmates from waiving their post-conviction appeals suggest "that arrange-
ments designed to vindicate society's supposedly independent interest in the integrity or reli-
ability of capital sentencing determinations could not be sensibly or effectively implemented").
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strengthened by the Court's holdings that third parties cannot gain
"next friend" standing to challenge death row inmates' waivers of ap-
peal,46 also discussed more extensively in Part I.
III. DEATH Row VOLUNTEERISM AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In light of Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Court's unwill-
ingness to adopt Justice Marshall's view of the Eighth Amendment as
"unwaivable" for the benefit of the American public's faith in the
criminal justice system, those who oppose death row volunteerism-
based on a belief that it undermines the criminal justice system gen-
erally,47 or that no competent defendant would choose to be put to
death 4 8-must consider an alternative framework in calling into ques-
tion its constitutionality. For that reason, a number of scholars have
turned to Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing specifi-
cally on Supreme Court case law related to refusal of medical treat-
ment and suicide. 49 Such substantive due process analysis 50 allows for
consideration of whether a waiver of post-conviction appeal is more
comparable to irrational suicide, physician-assisted suicide, or refusal
of lifesaving treatment-and, in turn, whether it is constitutional.
A. Death Row Volunteerism as Constitutionally-Unsupportable Suicide
Scholars and practitioners who construe death row volunteerism
through Fourteenth Amendment analysis disagree as to whether such
volunteerism is analogous to irrational (and constitutionally-
unsupportable) suicide. At one end of the spectrum, Richard J.
Bonnie dismisses this characterization as "hyperbole, of course,51 ar-
See Casey, supra note 1, at 79 ("In two cases, Gilmore v. Utah and Whitmore v. Arkansas, deal-
ing with 'next friend' standing, the United States Supreme Court has essentially foreclosed the
possibility of a constitutionally required mandatory and non-waivable appellate review of state
death sentences." (footnotes omitted)).
47 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 8, at 110 (asserting that the societal interest in preventing the
death penalty from being imposed without significant safeguards is strong because "[t] he death
penalty is irreversible").
48 See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 7 (recounting the beliefs of capital defense attorneys that
most death row volunteers are depressed and irrational, and thus are not competent to waive
post-conviction appeals).
49 See e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 604-05 (comparing the death row right to die with the
right to refuse treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment); Julie Levinsohn Milner, Dignity
on Death Row. Are Death Row Rights to Die Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the Termi-
nally Ill and the Terminally Sentenced, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 291
(1998) (arguing that death row volunteerism should be allowed so long as the Fourteenth
Amendment supports a right to physician-assisted suicide).
50 For a brief but thorough history of substantive due process analysis, see Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOuRO L. REV. 1501 (1999).
51 Bonnie, supra note 8, at 1375.
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guing that "only if execution of a lawfully imposed death sentence
amounts to homicide is the state an agent of suicide when it executes
a competent prisoner who has declined to contest his death sen-
tence."" From a more moderate perspective, Kathleen L. Johnson
argues that capital defendants who choose to be put to death are akin
to persons who face terminal illness, and not persons who, because of
depression or other mental illness, choose to commit suicide. 53 She
explains that capital defendants are unlike persons who irrationally
seek to commit suicide, because their choices lack two characteristics
of suicides.54 First, both groups lack a specific intent to die. In other
words, neither terminally ill persons nor persons on death row have a
desire to die; they just seek to greet imminent and unavoidable death
on their own terms.5 5 Second, they lack an active causation-both
terminally ill persons and persons on death row face imminent
deaths for reasons beyond their control, and they choose to hasten,
rather than to cause, their deaths. 6  Johnson further adds that
"[m]any suicide attempts are the product of rash, unbalanced, or
confused judgments-of mental disturbance[,]'1 while "most in-
stances of refusal of treatment represent careful decisions and not
rash attempts at self-destruction."'8 For Johnson, then, death row
volunteers make thoughtful, rational choices that may be entitled to
substantive due process protection, as discussed more extensively be-
low.
In another widely-cited treatise5 on this subject, Melvin I. Urofsky
argues that death row volunteerism is akin to irrationally chosen sui-
cider thus taking the opposite view from Richard Bonnie. However,
citing anecdotal evidence, he argues that such volunteerism is morally
supportable based on three principles of bioethics developed by Tom
L. Beauchamp and Henry F. Childress. ' First, with regard to the
principle of autonomy, Urofsky argues that death row inmates should
52 Id.
53 SeeJohnson, supra note 6, at 604 ("The death row inmate's assertion of a right to die by
refusing to appeal is most closely analogous to the terminal patient's asserted right to die in
refusal of treatment or antidysthanasia cases.").
54 Id. at 617.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 618.
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 7, at 1110 (discussing Urofsky's view of death row volun-
teerism as autonomy-enhancing).
W See Urofsky, supra note 6, at 576 (explaining that death row volunteerism "involves the
right to die not only when a person is terminally ill and wants to forgo weeks or months of suf-
fering with no hope of recovery, but when for other reasons, the quality of life is such that a
person no longer wants to live").
61 See id. at 578-79 (positing that principles of bioethics "provide a useful framework in
which to examine decisions made on death row").
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have the right to choose death as a final act of self-determination.62
Second, with regard to the principle of human worth, Urofsky argues
that, while society should prevent suicide generally based upon prin-
ciples of human worth, refusing to allow death row inmates to waive
appeals because of their intrinsic value as humans is hypocritical be-
cause those humans will be put to death by the state despite any "in-
trinsic value" that they may have.63 Finally, with regard to the princi-
ple of utility, he argues that society has less of a stake in protecting
death row inmates from choosing death because they will never con-
tribute to their communities. 4 But while some members of the legal
community might find compelling Urofsky's argument supporting
death row volunteerism because of a broad moral right for capital de-
fendants to choose suicide, his theory hardly establishes a constitu-
tional right to death row volunteerism under the Fourteenth
Amendment because, as discussed below, the U.S. Supreme Court
has considered the legality of assisted suicide only as it relates to
competent, terminally ill adults.
In a 2004 survey of twenty attorneys who represent capital defen-
dants, each of whom had represented at least one defendant that had
volunteered to be put to death,65 C. Lee Harrington challenges the
conclusions of both Johnson and Urofsky. She finds that many capi-
tal attorneys have serious concerns about the competency of death
66row inmates who choose to waive their remaining appeals. While
the Supreme Court has set forth a competency requirement in Godi-
nez v. Moran, Harrington notes that states have no real stake in en-
suring that death row inmates are legitimately competent and do not
suffer from debilitating depression or other mental disorder.68 She
then cites the perspectives of several capital attorneys with regard to
the mental competency of death row inmates who choose to expedite
execution. One attorney is ambivalent that any capital defendant
who chooses death can be competent:
I don't know if you can determine whether or not [death row
inmates] are making a rational decision.... There's a part of
me that thinks it can be done, but.., the circumstances on
death row and the pressures and stresses that people are sub-
62 Id.
63 Id. at 579-80.
64 Id. at 580-81.
For an overview of the survey methodology, see Harrington, supra note 7, at 1122-26.
See generally id. at 1126-40.
67 509 U.S. 389 (1993); see discussion supra Part I.
68 See Harrington, supra note 7, at 1143 ("[Tlhe highly politicized world of death penalty
litigation suggests that [some constitutional law scholars'] general assumption that competence
assessments are made in good faith might need to be reexamined in certain legal contexts.").
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jected to causes me to question every decision to those ap-
peals 9
Another attorney is more emphatic that death row volunteers most
likely are not competent:
[Death row inmates] can have relatively good days but a rela-
tively good day for someone condemned is a pretty bad day for
the rest of us. There are a lot of people who wind up here who
weren't dealt a great hand in the first place. Some were born
with significant mental deficiencies and they just lack the ca-
pacity to deal with the pressures. Most were so abused that
their limitations were made even more limited. What happens,
very arbitrarily, is that they succumb to some kind of mental ill-
ness... that robs them of the ability to deal with the pressures
when they come up.70
A third attorney is similarly skeptical that death row volunteers are
competent, explaining:
Is it rational to be depressed when you're facing some execu-
tion down the line? Is it rational to want to gain some modi-
cum of control in that process by basically forcing the state to
kill you when you want to be killed rather than when they want
you to be killed? Well, that seems rational, but it's rational only
in an insane sort of way.
71
Yet while Harrington's findings are compelling, they do not lend
themselves to a constitutional analysis of the status of death row volun-
teers. As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has held that in-
mates who meet the standard for competency set out in Godinez v.
Moran may make decisions regarding their defenses-or lack
thereof.72 While Harrington's data demonstrates flawed application of
the Godinez standard, which largely is a state policy issue, it does not
demonstrate that the standard itself is constitutionally flawed.74
69 Id. at 1137.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1140.
72 As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has held that, to determine whether defendants
are competent, lower courts must determine whether the defendants have a rational under-
standing of the proceedings against them and whether they have waived their constitutional
rights knowingly and voluntarily. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396-400.
73 To prevent flawed competency determinations, Harrington argues that states should
adopt a "therapeutic jurisprudence" approach to granting capital defendants' waivers of post-
conviction appeals, where defendants would be screened and treated for depression and other
mental illnesses; competent defendants would be granted the right to "plan[] for death and
assert[] some level of control over the process." Harrington, supra note 7, at 1144-45.
74 That is not to say that the Supreme Court could not determine that the standard for com-
petency set out in Godinez is unworkable, and therefore unconstitutional as applied. But the
Court has given no indication that such a ruling is likely, and that possibility is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
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In another study, published in 2005, John H. Blume similarlZ
analogizes persons who commit suicide to death row volunteers.
First, he discusses aggregated government data on persons who
commit suicide, noting that they frequently are white males with di-
agnosable mental health disorders. 76 He further explains that hope-
lessness and social isolation are strong predictors of suicide, and that
suicide is contagious among vulnerable populations like psychiatric
patients and prison inmates. He then turns to death row volunteers,
noting that, like persons who commit suicide, they overwhelmingly
are white, and they overwhelmingly suffer from mental illnesses of
varying degrees of severity.78 Moreover, he surveys attorneys who have
represented death row volunteers; thirty-nine pecent of those attor-
neys report that their clients waived post-conviction appeals because
of a sense of hopelessness.7 9 Blume also offers anecdotal evidence of
contagion among death row inmates, noting that rates of death row
volunteerism significantly increase after a volunteer is executed."'
Blume concludes that "there are important similarities between
persons who commit suicide and those who volunteer for execution;"
he asserts that those similarities are "extremely unlikely to be attrib-
utable to chance."'" At the same time, thirty-six percent of the attor-
neys that he surveys report that acceptance of responsibility or ac-
knowledgement of guilt was a factor in their clients' decisions to
volunteer to be put to death; Blume acknowledges that this statistic
undermines a categorical analogy of death row volunteerism to sui-
cide. 2 Blume thus concedes: "I do not think that I have shown-or
that subsequent data will show-that volunteering is inevitably a sui-
cidal act."'8  He ultimately advocates for a standard of competency
that is far more stringent than the standard set out in Godinez, to en-
814sure that no successful death row volunteers are suicidal. Blume
75 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV.
939 (2005).
76 Id. at 956-57 (noting that over ninety percent of suicide victims suffer from a diagnosable
mental health disorder).
77 Id. at 957-58.
78 Id. at 960-63.
79 Id. at 963.
80 Id. at 964.
81 Id. at 968.
82 Id. at 967.
83 Id.
84 Blume suggests that courts should undertake a two-prong inquiry into death row volun-
teers' competency: Courts first should ask if application of the death penalty objectively is just,
and then courts should determine if defendants are motivated by acceptance of their punish-
ment rather than a desire to commit suicide. Id. at 968. Blume does not believe that defen-
dants should be allowed to hasten their deaths in an effort to assert their autonomy. See id. at
970 ("[J]ust as rationality does not excuse participation in a suicide, it also should not legitimize
a death-row inmate's decision to waive his appeals and submit to execution.").
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therefore demonstrates that death row volunteers cannot categorically
be classified as persons who irrationally choose to commit suicide be-
cause of depression or other mental illness. Thus, as discussed below,
as a broad category of actors, death row volunteers probably can be
better analogized to terminally ill patients who choose to end their
own lives.
B. Death Row Volunteerism as Physician-Assisted Suicide
Portraying competent death row volunteers as terminally ill patients
who seek to end their lives through affirmative acts, rather than as ir-
rationally suicidal individuals, may be conceptually appealing to some
legal scholars or practitioners who believe that death row volunteer-
ism is-or should be-constitutional. In recent months, such an
analogy has become a relatively safe bet for those members of the le-
gal community, as the Supreme Court held that states may allow phy-
sicians to assist terminally ill persons in ending their lives. The Court
has addressed physician-assisted suicide on several occasions over the
past decade. First, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that
physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, s5 but the Court left the door open
for states to allow physician-assisted suicide. 6 And in Vacco v. Quill, a
companion case to Glucksberg, the Court asserted that, under the Due
Process Clause, there is a legitimate state interest in "prohibiting in-
tentional killing and preserving life; preventing suicide ... ; protect-
ing vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and psychologi-
cal and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible
,,81
slide towards euthanasia ....
In early 2006, the Supreme Court ruled88 on the constitutionality
of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, 9 the sole state statute author-
izing physician-assisted suicide in the United States, thus resolving, to
some extent, the question it left unanswered in Glucksberg and Quill:
Under the Federal Constitution, may states allow physicians to assist
terminally ill patients in committing suicide? In Gonzales v. Oregon,
the Court upheld the Death With Dignity Act, holding that the Fed-
95 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) ("The question presented in this case is whether Washing-
ton's prohibition against 'caus[ing]' or 'aid[ing]' a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not." (brackets in original)).
86 See id. at 735 (noting that, because the Court's holding merely allows states to ban physi-
cian-assisted suicide-and does not outlaw it altogether-states may continue to engage "in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide").
87 521 U.S. 793, 794 (1997).
88 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
89 Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (2003).
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eral Controlled Substance Act did not authorize the U.S. Attorney
General "to bar dispensing controlled substances for assisted suicide
in the face of a state medical regime permitting such conduct."9" The
Death With Dignity Act requires a patient who seeks her physician's
assistance in ending her life to meet three broad requirements: the
patient must have a terminal disease that will take her life within six
months;91 the patient must be capable-not suffering from a psychiat-
ric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judg-
ment;92 and the patient must act voluntarily.
9
The requirements of the Death With Dignity Act arguably can be
extended to death row volunteers, albeit with slight conceptual diffi-
culty. For example, with regard to the requirement that persons
choosing suicide have a terminal disease, Kathleen L. Johnson ex-
plains:
Both the terminal patient and the capital defendant face virtu-
ally certain and imminent death if the required treatment is
not administered or the appeal waived; both face future suffer-
ing, physical as well as mental, if they live on in the hospital or
on death row, and both will probably die anyway, if the treat-
ment is unsuccessful or if the appeal is denied.94
Furthermore, both the Death With Dignity Act and the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding capital defendant decision-making
require proof of competency. While, as discussed above, both C.
Lee Harrington and John H. Blume raise valid questions as to
whether the Godinez standard adequately ensures that every death row
volunteer is competent, the standard is not a toothless one.
Finally, both the Death With Dignity Act and standards related to
death row volunteerism require that decisions to hasten death be
voluntary. In the case of capital defendants, that means that the in-
mates must not choose death because of pressure from their attor-
neys to waive appeals or because of fear of losing access to counsel for
financial or other reasons. This risk is minimal based on the exten-
sive network of pro bono attorneys and organizations who champion
90 Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 925. It is important to note that the Court did not hold that there is a
Fourteenth Amendment right to physician-assisted suicide in the absence of state bans akin to
the one upheld in Glucksberg, rather, the Death With Dignity Act simply does not violate existing
federal positive law. The Court's ruling thus left the door open for Congress to attempt to pre-
empt the Death With Dignity Act in other ways (for example, through the Commerce Clause).
It is unclear whether the Court would uphold such attempts at federal preemption.
91 OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.805.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Johnson, supra note 6, at 604. But see Blume, supra note 75, at 947 (explaining that,
"[w]ith rare exceptions, volunteers are not terminally ill" and thus rejecting a comparison of
impending execution to terminal illness).
95 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing Godinez v. Moran).
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the rights of death row inmates.9 6  In their articles, Harrington, 97
Johnson," and Urofsky all cite numerous anecdotes where attorneys
fought extensively to prevent inmates from waiving appeals. In short,
then, the requirements of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act vis-a-vis
the ethical and constitutional requirements for death row volunteer-
ism support the comparison between terminally ill individuals and
capital defendants who seek to end their lives.
Julie Levinsohn Milner compellingly argues that this comparison
justifies a right to death row volunteerism, explaining that, "if the
right to die is allowed in other circumstances, namely those of the
terminally or chronically ill patient, then it should be acceptable as
applied to an inmate under a death sentence, which, in many salient
and powerful respects, is comparable to a terminal illness."'  Echo-
ing the analysis set out above, she argues that death row volunteerism
and physician-assisted suicide are similarly structured to prevent
abuse in the form of pressure from outside parties, such as health
care providers and attorneys who demand payment; to ensure com-
petence; and to preserve life whenever possible. 11 Furthermore, she
argues that attorneys and doctors have several key similarities, includ-
ing a desire to kee p their clients/patients alive and a fear of ethical
and legal sanction. 02 Finally, she argues that prisoners and patients
share similar sets of concerns: Members of each group seek to assert
their autonomy, die in a dignified manner, and escape grim con-
finement in hospices or hospitals, or on death row.1
0 3
Conceptually, then, physician-assisted suicide is probably the most
compelling analogy for characterizing death row volunteerism-and
for determining the constitutionality of death row volunteerism un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. The primary drawback to this par-
allel is that the constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide is not
fully resolved. As noted above, the Supreme Court recently upheld,
96 See, e.g., Nat'l Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty Affiliates, http://ncadp.org/
affiliatelinks.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2006) (listing national coalition members who are
united to end the death penalty and their web sites).
97 See Harrington, supra note 7, at 1123 ("[Capital defense lawyers interviewed for this arti-
cle] agree that... they are ethically obligated to try to persuade their client to change his or
her mind, and that it is ethically unacceptable for them to assist or facilitate the client in pursu-
ing execution." (citation omitted)).
98 SeeJohnson, supra note 6, at 584 (detailing ACLU and NAACP efforts to assist the mother
of Gary Gilmore, the death row volunteer who successfully sought execution in Gilmore v. Utah,
429 U.S. 1012 (1976)).
99 See Urofsky, supra note 6, at 556 (describing the refusal of defendant's attorney to waive
the defendant's appeals on his behalf in Bishop v. Wolff 444 U.S. 810 (1979)).
10 Milner, supra note 49, at 291.
1o Id. at 291-302.
102 Id. at 302-12.
103 Id. at 312-19.
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in Gonzales v. Oregon, °4 states' right to enforce statutes authorizing
physician-assisted suicide under the Federal Controlled Substance
Act, but it implicitly left the door open for Congress to attempt to
preempt the Death With Dignity Act in other ways, such as through
the Commerce Clause. 05
C. Death Row Volunteerism as Refusal of Treatment
Given the unresolved constitutional status of physician-assisted
suicide, another appealing framework for analyzing the constitution-
ality of death row volunteerism under the Fourteenth Amendment
may be as akin to refusal of lifesaving treatment. The Supreme
Court's doctrine in this area is far more settled. In 1976, in In re
Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a right to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment;0 6 this was one of the first, and most di-
rect, affirmations of this right. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health, the United States Supreme Court assumed for the sake
of argument that the right of a competent adult to refuse lifesaving
treatment is protected by the Due Process Clause;0 7 this decision
largely may be construed as an indirect affirmation of Quinlan. Fi-
nally, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court definitively recognized a
fundamental liberty interest in refusing lifesaving treatment under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
Still, despite the appealing constitutional clarity associated with
the analogy, likening death row volunteerism to refusal of treatment
is not as compelling a conceptual framework for exploring Four-
teenth Amendment implications to waiving post-conviction appeals as
are comparisons with physician-assisted suicide. It is true, as argued
above, that the defendant can be viewed as akin to a terminally ill pa-
tient. Yet the refusal-of-treatment analogy requires an additional con-
ceptual leap-the conflation of post-conviction appeals with lifesaving
104 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
105 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Gonzales v. Oregon).
106 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) ("The Court in Griswold found the unwritten constitutional
right of privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights 'formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.' Presumably this
right is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances .... (citations omitted)).
107 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition.").
108 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) ("The constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition that was discussed in Cruzan was not simply deduced from abstract concepts
of personal autonomy, but was instead grounded in the Nation's history and traditions, given
the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protect-
ing the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment." (citation omitted)).
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treatment-that may strain the analogy too much. Kathleen L. John-
son argues that this conceptual leap is not a terribly difficult one:
Since the mental suffering engendered by the uncertainty and
futility of continued death row confinement is closely analo-
gous to the physical suffering endured by terminal patients
pending the inevitable, but artificially suspended moment of
death, the capital defendants' refusal to appeal seems to fall
within [the same] zone of intimate decision.
Yet Johnson ignores a key distinction in American law between acts
and omissions: American legal jurisprudence distinguishes between
"killing," which has questionable legal and moral status, and "letting
die," which is legally-and morally-acceptable.11 ° Removal of lifesav-
ing treatment is widely viewed as "letting die," or a legally permissible
omission, because the cause of death is the disease. By contrast, phy-
sician-assisted suicide widely is viewed as "killing," or a legally-
ambiguous act, because the cause of death is the means used to
commit suicide."' Analogously, the cause of death for death row vol-
unteers is not their waiver of appeal-or, as Johnson argues, their re-
109 Johnson, supra note 6, at 614.
110 The Supreme Court recognized the act-omission distinction as it relates to physician-
assisted suicide and refusal of lifesaving treatment in Vacco v. Quill; the Court explained that the
distinction rests on several fundamental differences:
First, when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underly-
ing fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a
physician, he is killed by that medication. Furthermore, a physician who withdraws, or
honors a patient's refusal to begin, life-sustaining medical treatment purposefully in-
tends, or may so intend, only to respect his patient's wishes and "to cease doing useless
and futile or degrading things to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to
benefit from them." The same is true when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care;
in some cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the physician's pur-
pose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient's pain. A doctor who assists a sui-
cide, however, "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be
made dead." Similarly, a patient who commits suicide with a doctor's aid necessarily has
the specific intent to end his or her own life, while a patient who refuses or discontinues
treatment might not.
521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997) (citations omitted). For an extensive discussion of the Court's rec-
ognition of the act-omission distinction, see Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito--The Principle of Dou-
ble Effect in American Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469 (2005).
I This distinction has been widely criticized by legal scholars and practitioners alike. Most
notably, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Justice Scalia expressed his dissatis-
faction with this distinction, explaining:
I readily acknowledge that the distinction between action and inaction has some bearing
upon the legislative judgment of what ought to be prevented as suicide-though even
there it would seem to me unreasonable to draw the line precisely between action and
inaction, rather than between various forms of inaction.
497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see alsoJonathan R. Rosenn, The Constitutional-
ity of Statutes Prohibiting and Permitting Physician-Assisted Suicide, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 875, 890
(1997) ("[D]istinguishing between acts and omissions often becomes a matter of semantics.");
Donald R. Steinberg, Limits to Death with Dignity, 1 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 129, 156 n.134 (1988)
("[A]n omission [of withdrawing lifesaving treatment] seems to be equivalent to an act in that
the intent in both cases is to cause the death of the patient and the motive is the same.").
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fusal of "life-prolonging treatment"-but the affirmative act of a le-
thal injection by state physicians or prison officials." '
Therefore, the comparison of death row volunteerism to physi-
cian-assisted suicide ultimately is both more elegant and more com-
pelling than a comparison to refusal of lifesaving treatment because it
does not require an additional conceptual leap. The appeal of choos-
ing the refusal of lifesaving treatment as a framework for construing a
state's obligation to prevent death row volunteerism is its constitu-
tional clarity as compared to the still-unsettled constitutionality of
physician-assisted suicide. Accepting this framework means that, be-
cause states do not have an obligation to prevent competent termi-
nally ill patients from refusing lifesaving treatment, states also do not
have an obligation to prevent death row prisoners from waiving post-
conviction appeals.
IV. CONCLUSION: A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF DEATH Row VOLUNTEERISM
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a close reading of the
Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine related to defendant auton-
omy, competency, and the lack of standing of "next friends" who wish
to prevent competent capital defendants from waiving post-
conviction appeals lends itself to the conclusion that states do not
have a constitutional obligation to prevent death row volunteerism.
Such an inference of constitutionality is further supported by the
Court's Eighth Amendment case law, while opponents of the death
penalty, and even some Supreme Court Justices, argue that Eighth
Amendment protections are unwaivable for the good of society, a ma-
jority of the Court has not adopted this position. Attempts to charac-
terize death row volunteerism as suicide under the Fourteenth
Amendment similarly support the right for capital defendants to
waive post-conviction appeals. Death row volunteers probably are not
irrational actors seeking to end their lives because of clinical depres-
sion or other mental illness-at least when states adhere to the con-
112 Critics of this analogy may contend that a comparison between death row volunteerism
and refusal of lifesaving treatment is more compelling, because both simply hasten a certain
death, while physician-assisted suicide actually introduces an alternative means of ending a life.
However, this argument ignores the patients who refuse lifesaving treatment and then die not
because of their illness, but because of palliative care administered by medical professionals. See
Lyons, supra note 110, at 551 (discussing the nature of palliative care and the frequency with
which it is offered to patients who refuse lifesaving treatment). Furthermore, cessation of life-
saving treatment may occur for other purposes besides hastening death, while physician-assisted
suicide occurs solely to end a life. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 802 (noting that while a patient may
refuse lifesaving treatment and still wish to live, a patient who requests physician-assisted suicide
has intent to die). Death row volunteerism that results in execution, too, typically is centered
on quickly ending defendants' lives on death row.
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stitutional guidelines for competency set out in Rees v. Peyton," Godi-
nez v. Moran,"4 and their progeny. Rather, competent death row volun-
teers probably are more like terminally ill patients who seek to com-
mit physician-assisted suicide or who reject lifesaving treatment-
although both of these analogies have their drawbacks, either be-
cause constitutional doctrine is unsettled (in the case of physician-
assisted suicide), or because the conceptual leap required by the
analogy (in the case of refusal of lifesaving treatment) is a bit ex-
treme.
Why are scholars and practitioners so eager to challenge the con-
stitutionality of death row volunteerism despite little doctrinal sup-
port? Some are acting from a belief that states have little incentive to
ensure that capital defendants who waive their appeals are compe-
tent." 5 Others believe that the death penalty must be applied justly in
all cases to preserve the public's faith in the "rightness" of the crimi-
nal justice system, and such a just application only can be attained
through a rigorous appeals process." But in most cases, these mem-
bers of the legal community are acting from a deeply rooted belief
that the death penalty itself is inherently unjust, and that death row
volunteerism undermines the abolition of capital punishment by al-
lowing defendants to accept an unjust fate. Hugo A. Bedau, a
prominent death penalty abolitionist, has been particularly outspo-
ken against death row volunteerism. He argues that one defendant
sentenced to death has no right to jeopardize the lives of his fellow
death row inmates by waiving his post-conviction appeals; his theory is
that execution of one defendant will make it that much easier for
states to execute other defendants."" Viewing the death penalty as
state-sponsored murder, he argues that the death penalty becomes
"no less [unjust and unconstitutional] on those occasions when a
murderer welcomes his own legal execution[,] " 9 though there is
concern that states that administer capital punishment might dis-
"13 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
114 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
"5 See supra note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of C. Lee Harrington's argu-
ment that states have little incentive to ensure that death row volunteers are competent when
they waive their post-conviction appeals.
116 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall's view that allowing capital defendants to waive post-conviction appeals would undermine
societal faith in the integrity of the criminal justice system.
"7 Milner, supra note 49, at 628-29.
11s HUGO A. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 122 (Lex-
ington Books 1977) (suggesting that if individual death row inmates are allowed to waive their
post conviction appeals, "it will be just that much easier for such executions to become rou-
tine").
119 Id.
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agree. 1 ° Yet while these arguments may be compelling from a policy
perspective-in fact, they are viewpoints that I share-they are not
rooted in constitutional doctrine. As constitutional law currently
stands, to eliminate the individual right to death row volunteerism le-
gal scholars and practitioners with abolitionist beliefs first must con-
vince courts and/or legislatures to eliminate the death penalty itself.
120 Id.
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